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in this case is that three states must now contemplate sharing a narrow strip of
some two hundred miles long by 13.75 miles wide: a cartographic (and naviga-
tional) absurdity. To this extent, there is a similarity to the result in the June 1992
decision of the court of arbitration in the Canada/France arbitration regarding
St. Pierre and Miquelon.48
The Chamber's decision also reiterates the reluctance of the International
Court of Justice to perform a specific delimitation unless instructed to do so
specifically by the parties to the dispute. In relation to the El Salvador/Honduras
land frontier, a specific request was made by the parties, and the Court delimited
the six disputed zones. In the maritime part of the case, however, the Chamber
balked at effecting a delimitation because of the lack of consent by the parties.
The Chamber's decision on the maritime dispute-giving Honduras access to the
Pacific Ocean-further confirms the Court's longstanding position of protecting
the interests of states affected by an adverse geographical condition.4"
The primary importance of the principle of uti possidetis juris in delimiting
boundaries in Latin America was also reaffirmed. The role accorded to evidence
of effective occupation was limited to cases lacking clear evidence of uti possidetis
juris, and acquiescence in such an effective occupation could be identified. The
amount of evidence reviewed by the Chamber was enormous, and once again the
Court showed that it is able to digest vast amounts of evidence, in different areas
of law, with "exacting care." 50
The Chamber in its delimitation of the land frontier awarded Honduras two-
thirds of the territory in dispute. Loss of territory due to a judicial decision is
possibly the ultimate test of the Court's authority. The pledge made by both states
to abide by the decision is an indication of the Court's status and a demonstration
of its capacity to resolve similar disputes in the future. Moreover, the caution
expressed by the Chamber-the determination of sovereignty over only those
islands that were clearly in dispute and its reluctance to effect a maritime delimi-
tation-is a clear signal to future litigants that the Court will seek to limit the
remedy strictly to the jurisdiction in which it is invited to operate.
GIDEON ROTrEM
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Environment-extraterritorial effects of activities of federal agencies-waste dis-
posal in Antarctica-National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, INC. V. MASSEY. 986 F.2d 528.
U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir., Jan. 29, 1993.
In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, a private environmental
organization challenged a decision of the National Science Foundation (NSF or
Foundation) to incinerate food wastes in Antarctica. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the lower court's dismissal
4 Delimitation of the Maritime Areas between Canada and France June 10, 1992), reprinted in 31
ILM 1145 (1992), summarized in 87 AJIL 452 (1993).
" See North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ REP. 3 (Feb. 20).




of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the action
for consideration of the merits of plaintiff's claim, alleging a violation of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA or Act).' With this case, the
latest juncture in an ongoing controversy concerning the scope of NEPA, the
D.C. Circuit became the first court expressly to hold that NEPA applies to the
activities of federal agencies that have impacts beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.
NEPA has been described as the "environmental constitution." 2 The Act estab-
lishes requirements for the analysis of the potential effects of anticipated "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"3 in
a formal document known as an environmental impact statement (EIS). Regula-
tions' promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (Council), located in
the executive office of the President and charged by the statute' and executive
order' with oversight of the application of NEPA by all federal agencies, supple-
ment the requirements of the statute.
According to the Council's regulations and a considerable body of case law, an
EIS must contain the following elements: (1) a description of the proposed action;
(2) an analysis of the potentially affected environment; (3) a description of the
direct and indirect potential impacts on that environment resulting from the
proposed action; (4) a consideration of alternatives, including the alternative of
no action, and the potential impacts of those alternatives; and (5) an analysis of
mitigating measures. The Council's regulations further direct federal agencies to
commence consideration of the nature and extent of potential environmental
impacts of a proposed activity at an early stage through a process known as
"scoping." The Council's rules assure public participation in the preparation of
an EIS through, at a minimum, an opportunity for public comment'on a draft
statement and the requirement that agencies respond to those comments in the
final document. The authorizing federal agency must make its final resolution of
environmental concerns public in a document known as a "record of decision"
before the proposed action analyzed in the EIS may be undertaken. The availabil-
ity of judicial review of the procedural adequacy and substantive content of an
EIS pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act7 has long been established.'
The National Science Foundation, a federal agency, operates and exercises
exclusive control over the McMurdo Station, a research facility that is one of three
year-round installations the United States has established in Antarctica. Previ-
ously, the agency had disposed of food wastes from McMurdo Station by dumping
them at sea and burning them in an open pit. The Foundation had decided to
discontinue this practice by October 1991 and, after asbestos was discovered in
'National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1988).
'City of Roswell v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, [1973] 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,181, 20,183 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1972). Cf 40 C.F.R. §1500.1 (1992) (NEPA is "basic
national charter for protection of the environment").
3 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (1988).
4 40 C.R. §§1500-1508 (1992). See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (Council on
Environmental Quality's NEPA regulations entitled to "substantial deference").
42 U.S.C. §4342 (1988).
Exec. Order No. 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978) (amending Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 531
(1971)), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §4321 app. at 971 (1988).
7 5 U.S.C. §§701-706 (1988).
' See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109 (1971).
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the landfill, curtailed the burning even earlier. Instead, NSF decided to dispose of
food wastes in an "interim incinerator" until a state-of-the-art incinerator could
be delivered. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), a nonprofit group, chal-
lenged that decision on the grounds that the Foundation had failed adequately to
analyze the environmental consequences of the proposed action under NEPA.
The court .of appeals concluded that the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, in dismissing EDF's complaint, had erred in relying on the
presumption against extraterritorial application of United States law articulated
by the Supreme Court most recently in Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco).9 The D.C. Circuit devoted the bulk of
its opinion to distinguishing EDF's NEPA claim from the situation in Aramco,
which concerned the application of a civil rights statute to the employment prac-
tices of U.S. corporations that employ American citizens in a foreign jurisdiction.
By contrast with the legislation at issue in Aramco and other cases, NEPA is an
internal rule of governance addressed to governmental entities and officials
within the United States. NEPA does not attempt to regulate the activities of
private parties abroad. NEPA, concluded the D.C. Circuit, "binds only American
officials and controls the very essence of the government function: decisionmak-
ing. Because the decisionmaking processes of federal agencies take place almost
exclusively in this country and involve the workings of the United States govern-
ment, they are uniquely domestic."" ° According to the court of appeals, the proce-
dural, as opposed to substantive, focus of NEPA further reinforces the domestic
character of the conduct prescribed by the statute. In contrast to the statutory
provisions at issue in Aramco and other legislative enactments to which the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality applies, "NEPA would never require enforce-
ment in a foreign forum or involve 'choice of law' dilemmas"" that could arise in
situations in which U.S. law conflicts with that of a foreign sovereign.
The D.C. Circuit devoted a portion of its opinion to those characteristics that
make Antarctica legally unique, particularly its status as "a sovereignless conti-
nent."1 " Because of the prohibition on new territorial claims contained in the
Antarctic Treaty,' 3 observed the court, that continent is part of the "global com-
mons" and lies outside the jurisdiction of any state. In the absence of any poten-
tially conflicting sovereign authority, the court of appeals underscored the "sub-
stantial interest and authority"' 4 and "real measure of legislative control"' 5 the
United States exercises there, particularly with respect to McMurdo Station, a
U.S. government installation. Accordingly, concluded the court of appeals, these
factors "compel[] the conclusion that the [Aramco] presumption against extra-
territoriality is particularly inappropriate under the circumstances presented"' 6
by EDF's complaint.
NSF then argued that, even conceding the domestic character of NEPA and the
remote likelihood of conflict with foreign law, the potential for interference with
9 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991). 10986 F.2d 528, 532.
1 Id. at 533. 12 Id. at 534.
13 Dec. 1, 1959, 12 UST 794, 402 UNTS 71. The Antarctic Treaty, Article II of which establishes
"[f]reedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica," presumably is the international legal authority
under which NSF and the United States Government established McMurdo Station.
14 986 F.2d at 536. 15 Id. at 533.
16 Id. at 534. Cf Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 4684 (U.S. June 21, 1993)
(applying Aramco presumption against extraterritoriality to executive branch action on high seas).
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foreign relations undermined the plaintiff's proffered interpretation of the stat-
ute. The Foundation asserted that future international cooperation on environ-
mentally beneficial undertakings in Antarctica could be impeded if the executive
branch were to be subject to judicially imposed and managed requirements like
those contemplated by the plaintiffs request for injunctive relief. The court of
appeals rejected this argument, concluding that NEPA is consistent with existing
and anticipated international obligations of the United States, including the Pro-
tocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.17
More generally, the court was "not convinced that NSF's ability to cooperate
with other nations in Antarctica will be hampered by NEPA injunctions.""8 In
reaching this conclusion, the EDF court distinguished two D.C. Circuit cases,
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRDC v.
NRC) 9 and Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg,2° that had considered
the availability of injunctions under NEPA to a nuclear export-licensing proceed-
ing and an underground nuclear test, respectively. The EDF court asserted that
the results in those other NEPA cases, in which the requested relief had not been
awarded, turned on the potential for interference with United States foreign
policy. There might be occasions when "the foreign policy interests at stake are
particularly unique and delicate"21 and in such situations foreign policy concerns
might "outweigh the benefits derived from preparing an EIS."22 Nevertheless, the
court of appeals rejected the executive branh's assertions of harm to those inter-
ests in the case before it, concluding that adjudicating the merits of EDF's com-
plaint "would result in no ... threat to foreign policy."2 3
Last, the agency argued that, even in the absence of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, NEPA's statutory language precludes the Act's application to
impacts abroad. The court of appeals rejected this argument as well. Contrary to
the executive branch, which asserted that language in the statute directing federal
agencies to "recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems"24 ought to be interpreted narrowly, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
this intent informs all governmental activity addressed by the Act. Similarly com-
prehensive language in NEPA that is not specifically directed toward international
environmental problems reinforces this conclusion.
17 Oct. 4, 1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 22, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted in 30 ILM 1461
(1991) (not in force). The United States has signed the Protocol and the Senate has given its advice
and consent to ratification. The U.S. instrument of ratification has not been deposited, however,
because implementing legislation has not yet been enacted.
18 986 F.2d at 535.
19 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The federal action challenged in this case was the issuance by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a license for the export of nuclear materials and reactor equip-
ment to the Philippines. There was no majority opinion in the case; two members of the panel filed
separate opinions and the third took no part in the disposition of the case. See id. at 1346.
20 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In this case, the challenged action was an underground nuclear
explosion on Amchitka Island, Alaska. See id. at 797. Unlike EDF and NRDC v. NRC, Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility concerned activities occurring within the territory of the United States with
impacts on the domestic environment. Compare Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, 463 F.2d at 797
(involving activities within the United States) with EDF v. Massey, 986 F.2d at 529 (involving activities
within Antarctica) and NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1347 (involving trading activities with impacts in
foreign state).
2' 986 F.2d at 535. 22 Id.
" Id. at 536. 24 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(F) (1988).
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The appeals court's straightforward opinion gives little indication of the long
and complex legal and policy history of the so-called NEPA abroad question,
which has persisted sporadically for more than twenty-three years. By the late
1970s, nearly a decade after the statute was enacted, litigation,2 5 legislation 26 and
regulatory policy making27 dealing with the statute's applicability to environmen-
tal effects outside the United States substantially elevated the profile of the ge-
neric issue. The Carter administration, after long and acrimonious internal bat-
ties, responded in an across-the-board fashion by promulgating Executive Order
No. 12,11428 on the environmental effects abroad of major federal actions. The
Executive Order, published in 1979 and applied since as the principal legal au-
thority for analyzing overseas environmental impacts, has been widely criticized
for falling short of the statutory requirements. 29 Dissatisfaction with the Executive
25 E.g., National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United States Dep't of State, 452
F.Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal dismissed, [1979] 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,517 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 24, 1979) (applicability of NEPA to pesticide spraying in Mexico to destroy marijuana plants
assumed without deciding); Gemeinschaft zum Schutz des Berliner Baumbestandes v. Marienthal,
[1979] 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,011 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 1978) (construction of apartment
complex in West Berlin not a federal project); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F.Supp. 53, 421 F.Supp.
63 (D.D.C. 1975, 1976) (assuming applicability of NEPA to highway through Panama and Colombia),
vacated sub noma. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 391 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (declining to decide
issue in view of impacts in United States); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Agency
for Int'l Dev., [1976] 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,121 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 1975) (stipulation
requiring Agency for International Development to promulgate regulations on environmental analysis
of activities with effects outside United States); Sierra Club v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 6 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1980, [1974] 4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,685 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974) (ordering
agency to prepare EIS for nuclear power export activities); People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F.Supp.
811, 816 (D. Haw. 1973) (application to U.S. trust territory).
26s. 3077, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §5 (1978) (proposing to exempt foreign activities of Export-Import
Bank from NEPA).27 
see, e.g., Comment, Forthcoming CEQ Regulations to Determine Whether NEPA Applies to Envi-
ronmental Impacts Limited to Foreign Countries, [1978] 8 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,111 (June
1978); Comment, Renewed Controversy Over the International Reach of NEPA, [1977] 7 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,205 (Nov. 1977).
28 Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §4321 app. 978 (1988)
[hereinafter Executive Order]. The promulgation of the Executive Order immediately affected pend-
ing NEPA litigation concerning overseas environmental impacts. See, e.g., National Org. for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws v. United States Dep't of State, [1979] 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,517 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 24, 1979) (stipulation of dismis sal of claims based on extraterritorial impacts in
light of Executive Order), 508 F.Supp. 1, 1 n. 1 (D.D.C. 1979) (approving environmental analyses of
foreign impacts prepared pursuant to Executive Order); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Export-Import Bank, [1979] 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,145 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1979) (stipula-
tion .of dismissal without prejudice of claims based on extraterritorial impacts in light of Executive
Order). In 1992 NSF adopted regulations implementing the Executive Order for activities in Antarc-
tica. 45 C.F.R. pt. 641 (1992), 57 Fed. Reg. 40,339 (Sept. 3, "1992). See generally David A. Wirth,
International Technology Transfer and Environmental Impact Assessment, in TRANSFERRING HAZARD-
OUS TECHNOLOGIES AND SUBsTANcEs: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHALLENGE 83, 93 n.32 (Guinther
Handl & Robert Lutz eds., 1989) (citing regulations of federal agencies implementing Executive
Order).
" See generally Sanford E. Gaines, "Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions": An
Executive Order Ordains a National Policy, 3 HARv. ENvT. L. REv. 136 (1979); Francis M. Allegra,
Note, Executive Order 12,114-Environmental Effects Abroad: Does It Really Further the Purpose of
NEPA, 29 CLv. ST. L. REV. 109 (1980); J. D. Head, Comment, Federal Agency Responsibility to
Assess Extraterritorial Environmental Impacts, 14 TEx. INT'L L.J. 425 (1979); Christopher C. Leh-
mann, Note, The International Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: A New
Strategy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 1063; Comment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World Environment,
131 U. PA. L. REv. 353 (1982); John C. Peirce, Note, Exports and Environmental Responsibility:
[Vol. 87
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Order and cases like NRDC v. NRC, in which the courts declined to apply NEPA
to environmental impacts outside the United States, have kept the "NEPA
abroad" debate alive in Congress, where legislative solutions to the underlying
problem have intermittently been proposed."
The precise relationship between the statute and the Executive Order, which,
"[w]hile based on independent authority .... furthers the purpose of [NEPAl,"3'
is unclear. In any event, by contrast with the statute, "nothing in [the Executive
Order] shall be construed to create a cause of action.""2 Accordingly, to the
extent that the Executive Order applies, judicial review may be precluded."3 The
Executive Order exempts sweeping categories of actions from its coverage alto-
gether, including situations in which the foreign nation affected by the action
participates with the United States, all votes in international organizations, and
export-licensing proceedings except those involving nuclear technologies. For
many of those actions not excluded from its scope, the Executive Order requires
only a minimal environmental analysis. For example, instead of a full-blown EIS,
the analysis of some impacts outside the United States might consist only of "con-
cise reviews of the environmental issues involved, including environmental assess-
ments [or] summary environmental analyses." 4
Although the court of appeals distinguished a number of precedents from its
own circuit, it failed to mention Greenpeace USA v. Stone,"5 the only other post-
Executive Order "NEPA abroad" case to consider impacts on the global com-
mons and a case that reached a result contrary to that in EDF v. Massey. Green-
peace concerned a plan of the United States Army and the Department of De-
fense, together with the German army, to remove obsolete chemical weapons
from a storage site in Clausen, Germany. The weapons were to be transported by
rail and ship to Johnston Atoll, a U.S. territory in the Pacific Ocean, pursuant to a
congressional mandate directing the destruction of the entire U.S. chemical weap-
ons inventory by 1997. EISs required by NEPA had been prepared for the federal
actions on Johnston Atoll. But potential environmental impacts on the high seas
had been analyzed only pursuant to the 1979 Executive Order. Effects within
Germany were not analyzed even under the Executive Order, presumably because
the removal of the arsenal was considered exempt from that instrument by virtue
of the German Government's participation. Plaintiffs challenged the executive
Applying NEPA to the Export-Import Bank, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247 (1979); Glenn Pincus, Note,
The "NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive Order, 30 BuFF. L. REv. 611 (1981);
Sue D. Sheridan, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of NEPA under Executive Order 12,114, 13
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173 (1980); Therese M. Welsh, Note, Agency Responses to Executive Order
12,114: A Comparison and Implications, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481 (1981); Matthew T. McGrath &
Carl T. Gulliver, Recent Development, Executive Order on Extraterritorial Environmental Impacts, 13
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 455 (1979); Comment, President Orders Environmental Review of International
Actions, [19791 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,011 (Jan. 1979).
"' See, e.g., S. 1278, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1271, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1089,
101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989); H.R. 1113, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
s' Executive Order, supra note 28, §1-1. -' Id. §3-1.
" See EDF v. Massey, 986 F.2d at 530 (in summarizing Executive Order, noting that "what is at
stake in this litigation is whether a federal agency may decide to take actions significantly affecting the
human environment in Antarctica without complying with NEPA and without being subject to judicial
review"). Cf supra note 7 (judicial review of agency compliance with NEPA available under Adminis-
trative Procedure Act).
'4 Executive Order, supra note 28, §2-4(a)(iii).
" 748 F.Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991).
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branch's failure to prepare a comprehensive EIS covering all aspects of the trans-
portation and disposal of the European stockpile, including transit through Ger-
many and transport over the ocean.
After denying plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the removal of the stockpile from Germany,36 the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii denied a subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction. s
Rejecting exhortations from the executive branch, the court explicitly declined to
hold that the Executive Order superseded NEPA for all environmental impacts
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Nonetheless, the court
concluded that in the case before it the Executive Order, and not the statute,
articulated an acceptable standard for analyzing effects on the global commons-
in that case, the high seas. Although its reasoning is rather opaque, the court was
plainly influenced by the "compelling" foreign policy context of the case." The
executive branch had made representations to the German Government that the
United States would remove the stockpile by a "date certain," a deadline that
might slip if the court granted the requested relief. Transit over the ocean, ob-
served the court, was interrelated with, and a "necessary consequence" of, this
promise. 9 The court also appeared to be swayed by the executive branch's ac-
knowledgment that some environmental analysis was necessary, which reduced
the case to a dispute only over the content of that documentation. By the time the
case reached the Ninth Circuit, the munitions had already been removed and the
court did not reach the merits.40
Even before EDFv. Massey, no court had concluded that NEPA does not apply
to extraterritorial impacts or that the 1979 Executive Order supersedes the stat-
ute for overseas effects. The two cases that presented these questions prior to
EDF v. Massey-NRDC v. NRC" and Greenpeace4-held only that NEPA did
not govern the situation before the court on a case-by-case basis. The courts in
those cases accepted alternative environmental analyses prepared pursuant to the
Executive Order only after concluding that NEPA was inapplicable.
Although the D.C. Circuit did not directly state as much, its holding in EDF v.
Massey inescapably leads to the conclusion that the Executive Order is insufficient
as legal authority for the assessment of the effects in Antarctica presented by that
case. First, the court noted that before the Executive Order was promulgated,
NSF had adopted regulations that applied NEPA's EIS requirement with full
force to proposed agency decisions affecting Antarctica. Toward the end of its
opinion, the court noted that, at least prior to the adoption of the Executive
Order, the Council on Environmental Quality had similarly asserted NEPA's ap-
plication to impacts in Antarctica. Otherwise, the EDF court merely summarized
the requirements of the Executive Order but declined to apply the prescriptions
of that instrument as a rule of decision in the case.
The court of appeals decided EDF v. Massey only days after the Clinton admin-
istration took office. Soon after the decision was handed down, the Department of
Justice, arguing that the opinion could be construed to have very broad applica-
tion to overseas impacts, solicited the views of other agencies concerning the
desirability of further review in the courts. Reportedly, the Departments of State,
" Greenpeace USA v. Stone, [1991] 21 Envtl. L. Rep (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,378 (D. Haw. Aug. 9,
1990).
17 Greenpeace, 748 F.Supp. at 768. sO Id. at 763.
s9 Id. 40 Greenpeace, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991).
41 647 F.2d 1345, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 12 748 F.Supp. 749, 761 (D. Haw. 1990).
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Defense and Justice, as well as other federal agencies with foreign policy responsi-
bilities, supported filing a petition for rehearing and suggestion of rehearing en
bane, a course that was opposed by the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Council. Anecdotal accounts suggest that the question was ultimately resolved by
the President himself with a decision not to pursue further judicial process.4" On
March 15, 1993, the Department ofJustice released a press statement, supposedly
the quid pro quo for the decision not to seek further judicial remedies, that reads
in its entirety as follows:
In declining to seek a rehearing in [EDF v. Massey] today, the administra-
tion has decided not to challenge the Court's precise holding-namely, that
the National Environmental Policy Act applies to the National Science Foun-
dation's activities in Antartica [sic] described in the opinion. However, the
administration does not embrace language in the opinion which may be in-
terpreted to extend beyond this holding."
The time limitation for filing a petition for certiorari seeking review by the Su-
preme Court has also now expired. As part of its response to the case, the execu-
tive branch is said to have initiated a review of the applicability of NEPA to
overseas environmental effects, which may include modifications to the 1979 Ex-
ecutive Order.
Regardless of the executive branch's interpretation of the case, EDF v. Massey
breaks new ground by (1) rejecting application of a presumption against extra-
territoriality to NEPA cases involving impacts outside the jurisdiction of the
United States; (2) concluding that the plain language of the Act applies to those
impacts; and (3) rejecting on their merits the executive branch's assertions of
adverse foreign policy implications if the statutory requirements were to apply.
But the court of appeals specifically declined to speculate as to how the holding in
the case before it might apply to other NEPA cases of environmental impacts
within the territory of a foreign state, as opposed to the global commons,4 or to
situations involving application of other U.S. statutes in Antarctica. Leaving aside
the perhaps greater potential for adverse effects on foreign policy, the D.C. Cir-
cuit's analysis for the most part would appear to apply with equal validity to all
extraterritorial environmental impacts under NEPA. On the other hand, the EDF
court's identification of aspects it described as unique to the legal status of Antarc-
tica-a substantial U.S. presence, interest and authority-might distinguish that
continent even from other areas beyond national jurisdiction like the high seas,
which were the subject of the Greenpeace case. Because the EDF court did not
articulate the analytical significance of these distinctive features, it is difficult to
determine with precision to what extent they were determinative of the outcome
in the case.
EDF v. Massey also leaves open the important question of the role, if any, of
foreign policy concerns in NEPA cases. Although in the case before it the EDF
13 Cf LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS, 1992 PRESIDENTIAL PROFILES 34 (1992) (statement by
presidential candidate William Clinton in debate that "I support legislation to apply the National
Environmental Policy Act to federal actions overseas").
"Statement by the Department of Justice on EDF v. Massey (Mar. 15, 1992 [sic]).
At least one case pending in the D.C. Circuit raises this question. NEPA Coalition of Japan v.
Cheney, Civ. No. 91-1522 (D.D.C. filed June 20, 1991), is an action seeking to compel the Depart-
ment of Defense to comply with NEPA with respect to certain of that agency's specified activities in
Japan.
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court expressly rejected assertions by the executive branch of harm to foreign
policy, the court explicitly left open the possibility that foreign policy overtones
might affect the outcome in another, different situation. However, the court gave
little insight into the appropriate legal and analytical treatment of prudential
foreign policy considerations, an inquiry that has historically created difficulties
for the courts in crafting and implementing judicially manageable standards. 46
The EDF court did not overtly address the relationship, if any, between the legisla-
tive mandate and the foreign policy context of a particular case. NRDC v. NRC
and Greenpeace might be read to suggest the existence of an implied "foreign
policy exception," not found in the statutory language, that might affect the
applicability of NEPA on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. But the better view, as the
D.C. Circuit held in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg47 and sug-
gested in EDF v. Massey, is probably that the foreign policy milieu of a particular
case affects only the availability of injunctive relief, a discretionary equitable rem-
edy, and not the merits.41
More generally, the EDF opinion effectively rebuts arguments, often voiced by
the executive branch,49 that the application of NEPA to effects outside the United
States implies the imposition of regulatory requirements that offend principles of
international jurisdiction.5 0 Instead, after EDF v. Massey, it is clear that the stat-
ute governs activities at the core of domestic jurisdiction, namely, the operation
of the United States Government. NEPA, moreover, is not in a strict sense a
regulatory statute that prescribes the behavior of private parties; rather, it pre-
scribes an outcome-neutral, process-oriented approach involving primarily the
collection and analysis of information by governmental authorities. Merely be-
cause the subject of a governmental analysis lies outside the territory of the
United States does not suggest that performing that analysis is an extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. Indeed, a considerable body of international law estab-
lishes that it is both desirable and necessary for states to perform a NEPA-like
analysis before authorizing proposed activities that might have environmental
effects abroad.5
Depending on one's point of view, EDFv. Massey might be read either to clarify
or to complicate further a previously unsettled area of the law. In any event, the
46 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANcir, PoLMCAL QUESTIONS/JuDIciAL ANsWFs: DOES THE RuL OF
LAw APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFArRs? (1992); Thomas M. Franck, Courts and Foreign Policy, FOREIGN
PoL'Y, Summer 1991, at 66.
47 See 463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
41 Cf Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (political ques-
tion doctrine inapplicable to questions of statutory interpretation involving foreign relations con-
cerns). See generally Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (violation of environmental
statute found, but no injunctive relief awarded).
" See, e.g., Letter from Jennifer Joy Wilson, Assistant Administrator for External Affairs, United
States Environmental Protection Agency, to Gerald Studds, Chairman, Subcommittee on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
United States House of Representatives (Apr. 11, 1989) (asserting that "application of existing NEPA
requirements [to impacts abroad] could raise sovereignty issues"), reprinted in Appropriation Authori-
zation for the Office of Environmental Quality for Fiscal Years 1989-1993 and Oversight of the
National Environmental Policy Act: Hearing on H.R. 1113 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1989).
5
" See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §402
(1987) (bases of jurisdiction to prescribe).
"' E.g., Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25,
1991, reprinted in 30 ILM 802 (1991) (not in force, but signed by United States). See generally Wirth,
supra note 28 (discussing additional international instruments).
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D.C. Circuit's ruling tends to increase the opportunities for private parties like
the plaintiff in this case to participate in and obtain judicial relief with respect to
executive branch decision making on matters related to foreign policy. There is
little doubt that these recent developments will reinvigorate the "NEPA abroad"
debate.
DAVID A. WIRTH*
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Sovereign immunity-commercial activity of an instrumentality of aforeign state not
having a direct effect in the United States-waiver of immunity
KAO HWA SHIPPING CO. v. CHINA STEEL CORP. 816 F.Supp. 910.
U.S. District Court, S.D.N.Y., March 23, 1993.
Plaintiff, a Panamanian corporation having an office and place of business in
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, Republic of China, brought an action against China Steel
Corp. (CSC) alleging that CSC had negligently loaded and stowed a moisture-
laden cargo on plaintiff's vessel, causing the cargo to shift and the vessel to
founder. CSC failed to answer the complaint and a default judgment was entered.
Subsequently, CSC moved to set aside the default and to dismiss the complaint for
lack of both subject matter and personal jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),1 as well as for lack of personal jurisdiction under
New York law and forum non conveniens. Plaintiff countered that CSC at material
times was engaged in commercial activity having a direct effect in the United
States within the meaning of the FSIA's commercial activity exception to jurisdic-
tional immunity2 and that, in any event, CSC had implicitly waived immunity
under the FSIA.3 The district court granted the motion to set aside the default
and dismiss the complaint, holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion because (1) CSC was an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, (2) CSC's
commercial activity did not have a direct effect in the United States, and (3) CSC
had not implicitly waived immunity.
In 1989 CSC sold to Spacific Commercial Corp. (Spacific) 16,500 metric tons
of a product known as Metallurgical Coke Breeze and was paid by Spacific under
an irrevocable letter of credit. The product was divided into three parcels, each of
5,500 metric tons, and the parcels were delivered by CSC to Spacific in Kaoh-
siung. Two parcels were sold by Spacific to buyers in Kaohsiung and a third to a
Philippine company. Spacific chartered plaintiffs vessel Kao Hwa III to lift the
third parcel on the chartered voyage from Taiwan to the Philippines. En route the
vessel sank, resulting in the total loss of her cargo and part of her crew. Plaintiff
produced a bill of lading of doubtful provenance purportedly covering the ship-
ment, which named CSC as shipper and provided that the bill of lading was to be
construed in accordance with Japanese law and that disputes were to be referred
to the High Court of Justice in Taiwan.
* This work was supported by a grant from the Creswell Foundation. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the adv.ice and assistance of Dinah Bear, Mary M. Brandt, Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., S.Jacob Scherr
and Mary A. Stilts.
'28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1988).
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